INTRODUCTION
In her Beyond Marchiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age, Beryl Radin asserted "If there is a single theme that characterizes the public sector in the 1990s, it is the demand for performance" (2000, 168) . Likewise, for many firms in the private sector attention to enhanced effectiveness has become critical to survival as global competition has intensified (Scott 1998) . Performance -or effectiveness -of organization has become a central line of research for academics interested in both the public and the private sectors. For scholars and practitioners in public administration, public management, and public policy, though, the search for government performance or effectiveness has intensified with frequent and widely adopted reforms of the last quarter century (Ingraham and Moynihan 2000) . In sum, studying effectiveness or performance helps us better understand the role of accountability in governance.
Research on organizational effectiveness divides into two halves: the development of measurement criteria, and studies that predict organizational effectiveness using sets of independent variables (Campbell 1977) . Relatively few studies address questions of measuring government effectiveness (e.g., Provan and Milward 2001; Boyne 2002; Selden and Sowa 2004; Brewer 2006) , but a variety examine the second by proposing models of or explanations for effectiveness (e.g., Wolf 1993 Wolf , 1997 Provan and Milward 1995; Meier 1999, 2003; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Brewer and Selden 2000; Lynn, et al. 2000; Boyne 2003; Ingraham, et al. 2003; Kim 2004; Moynihan and Pandey 2005) . Ironically, while public officials emphasize measures of organizational effectiveness, scholars have yet to develop clear and conclusive ways of defining and assessing effectiveness (Rainey 2003) . Few questions challenged scholars more than what constitutes organizational performance or effectiveness (Selden and Sowa 2004) .
Most studies assess one government agency's effectiveness, the effectiveness of several networked agencies, or the effectiveness of a state or federal government within a single country.
Few have assessed the perceived effectiveness of a country's entire government or compared effectiveness across national governments. There is a distinct lack in public administration research of "outcome measures of institutional performance at the jurisdictional level" organizations (Kirlin 2001, 141) -at the level of the national government, the state government, or the local government (Yang and Holzer 2006) . Several attempts have tried to measure the effectiveness or performance of a whole government; for example, the Government Performance Project (GPP), one of the most elaborate initiatives in assessing effectiveness of governments, developed a process for rating the management capacity of local and state governments and federal agencies in the United States.
However, "in spite of its name, the GPP does not measure performance directly, but rather evaluates the capacity of management systems in government entities" (Rainey 2003, 140) . A second, the United Kingdom Audit Commission's Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), is calculated for all major English local authorities (Andrew, et al. 2006) . In his classic work on government in Italy, Putnam identified three dimensions of government performance: policy processes (e.g., cabinet stability, budget promptness, and statistical and information services), policy pronouncements (e.g., reform legislation and legislative innovation), and policy implementation (e.g., industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, local health unit expenditures, housing and urban development, and bureaucratic responsiveness) (Putnam 1993) . But even Putnam's index is limited in that measures capacity more than performance (Yang and Holzer 2006) .
Like others, we emphasize the need for comparison in understanding and assessing government effectiveness. For Pfeffer, "the statement that an organization is effective necessarily implies a comparison with some other organization or set of organizations" (1977, 133) .
Comparison is part of what helps public administration achieve scientific status (Dahl 1947) , although most of those studies are limited to select countries usually from the developed world. Brewer (2004) analyzed administrative reform and bureaucratic performance in twenty-five countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with performance data from the International Country Risk Group. Van de Walle (2006) critically reviewed performance data from the World Bank, the European Central Bank's public sector efficiency study, the Global Competitiveness Report, and the World Competitiveness Yearbook; he then ranked thirty-six OECD and European Union countries using World Bank data.
Our paper assesses effectiveness by examining entire governments and comparing across countries. We focus on two research questions. The first question is what is government effectiveness. We offer a description of how to conceptualize government effectiveness or performance in terms of the whole government, and not just in terms of an agency or several networked agencies, and then how that leads to different measurement schemes. Our second research question is how countries compare in terms of perceived government effectiveness. This paper fills a gap in the literature on government effectiveness by using the World Bank dataset (Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006) to assess perceived effectiveness across 212 countries.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we address different approaches to understanding and measuring organizational effectiveness, especially in the public sector, and we offer description on World Bank Governance Indicators. In the third section, we analyze perceived effectiveness data for a wide variety of countries and introduce the research enterprise of comparing effectiveness. Finally, we offer a discussion of the measurement and analysis of effectiveness and how this approach pushes the boundaries of the study of governance.
THEORY
While the concept of organizational effectiveness is central to the literature on organizations and management because of its importance to the investigation of organizational structures, processes, and outputs (Cameron and Whetten 1981) , we have long struggled with understanding of what constitutes the concept (Steers 1975) . For instance, for Barnard an organizational action is effective when "a specific desired end is attained" (1938, 19) . Osborne and Gaebler see effectiveness as a measure of the quality of output, answering the question "how well did it achieve the desired outcome?" (1992, 351) . One detailed answer is that effectiveness refers to whether the agency does well what it is supposed to do, whether people in the agency work hard and well, whether the actions and procedures of the agency and its members help achieve its mission, and in the end, whether it actually achieves its mission (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999) .
However, most agree that there is little consensus regarding what organizational effectiveness means or how to assess it properly (Cameron and Whetten 1983) for effectiveness has long been one of the most pervasive yet least delineated organizational constructs (Goodman and Pennings 1977) , leading to a field in "conceptual disarray" (Connolly, et al. 1980, 211) . Scholars pursue the topic in part because it is the ultimate dependent variable; the construct lies at the center of all models of organizations, and individuals always see the need to judge the effectiveness of organizations (Pfeffer 1977; Cameron and Whetten 1983; Au 1996) . In the public sector, the concern with performance and effectiveness is at least implicit because effectiveness affects the national quality of life and ability to survive (Rainey 2003) . One of three big questions in public management is how public managers measure achievement (Behn 1995) . We center our discussion of what organizational effectiveness means and how it should be measured on four key issues.
Effectiveness or Performance?
Most scholars of public and private sector organizations do not clearly differentiate between "effectiveness" and "performance", often implicitly substituting terms like performance or productivity for effectiveness (Cameron and Whetten 1983) . 1 For Selden and Sowa, "scholars often use the terminology 'effectiveness' and 'performance' interchangeably to describe the same phenomenon, the overall ability of organizations to perform well or effectively pursue their missions" (2004, 396) . The evidence for this is also probably its reason: that the lack of clear consensus about the concepts or definitions of effectiveness and performance causes most to assume that the two terms mean the same thing.
In contrast, some see effectiveness as one dimension of overall organizational performance. Nord (1983) sees effectiveness as the bottom line measure of performance; Walker and Boyne (2006) regard effectiveness as one of six dimensions of performance. Brewer and Selden (2000) selected effectiveness as one of three performance-related values (but then used the terms effectiveness and performance interchangeably). Our position is that effectiveness and performance can be used interchangeably only if effectiveness refers to the overall state of an organization seeking to fulfill goals related to its mission rather than effectiveness with regard to specific performance indicators. In this study, we use these terms interchangeably, although the measurement scheme we use for the concept involves a particular interpretation of effectiveness as a latent variable.
Levels (Units) of Analysis
Levels of analysis refers to the question of the appropriate unit of analysis for measuring the construct of effectiveness. This issue is one source of the inability of researchers to agree on how to define and operationalize this construct (Campbell 1977; Cameron and Whetten 1981) . Researchers use units of analysis that fit for the purpose of their research agenda. Sometimes the unit of analysis is a large organization with personnel located at many places, sometimes it is all the people under one roof, and sometimes the unit of analysis is an organizational subunit corresponding to the immediate work group (Campbell 1977) ; "performance analysis is done at three levels -the individual employee or small group, the program, and the organizational level" (Boschken 1994, 309) . While scholars select units of analysis according to individual tastes, not all make the distinction of unit of analysis clear (Boschken 1994) .
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It may be as some claim that the debate over levels of analysis is bewildering and futile (Cameron and Whetten 1981 ), but we believe that clarifying the unit of analysis helps us identify the match between measurement criteria and the unit, and that this matching contributes to our understanding of the concept of effectiveness. Table 1 shows how we categorize the units of analysis examined in previous organizational effectiveness studies based on our review of scholars'
arguments and a search of the literature. We identify two dimensions: the locus of analysis, and the focus of analysis as shown. By locus of analysis we mean the place where the assessment of effectiveness happens; by focus of analysis we mean the subject of effectiveness measurement. We see the assessment of effectiveness in the case of the public sector as taking place at the levels of the individual employee, the subunit of an organization, a single organization, in multiple or networked organizations, and at the level of the entire government. As the subject of the assessment enterprise, scholars usually choose the performance of either a specific program or the organization as a whole.
Below we review a few relevant studies across these nine combinations of the dimensions, which comprise "units of analysis", but we offer one example here. (Parks 1984; ).
Subjective measures of effectiveness are generally regarded as perceptual assessments because of the use of a survey or questionnaire. One criticism is that subjective measures are biased since they assess effectiveness by using an informant's recall (Golden 1992 ); a second is that they have the potential for monomethod bias, although recent advances suggest that this perceived bias in self-report surveys is little more than an "urban legend" (Spector 2006) . Objective measures are seen as reflecting the real world accurately and minimizing the discretion of the study designer (Meier and Brudney 2002 Walker and Boyne (2006) argue that judgments of performance based on archival information or individual perceptions are not objective -that "some subjectivity and political bias are likely to be present in both archival and perceptual data" (2006, 379) .
performance is paramount because multiple constituencies (e.g., consumers, taxpayers, employees, politicians) may hold varying interpretations of effectiveness, while in the private sector strong financial results may serve as a "focal point" for measurement . Objective measures often suffer from instrumentation effects (if the instrument for measuring performance interacts with the organizational processes and changes the meaning of performance), cheating (if cases are selected that produce favorable numbers), or reporting false data ).
We center our investigation here on the use of a perception measure drawn from the World We rely on subjective measures of government effectiveness in this study for three reasons.
First, organizational performance is a concept that is socially-constructed by multiple stakeholders (especially in the public sector) (2006) . Perception measures are more appropriate for capturing the complex and multiple dimensions of an entire government's performance. Second, measures of perceived organizational performance are positively correlated with objective measures of organizational performance (Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Dollinger and Golden, 1992; McCracken, et al. 2001; Pearce, et al. 1987; Powell, 1992) ; inference from perception data provides a lens into hidden processes of actual (or objective) effectiveness. Last, "except when either subjective or objective measures are distorted by low reliability or deliberate error, neither is an inherently superior estimate of organizational performance in the public sector" (Andrews, et al. 2006, 45) . In this sense, perception data for measuring effectiveness at this level or unit of analysis is probably at least as good as objective data, were they available.
Measurement Criteria
Scholars have sought the best way to define and measure organizational performance, but they have not come to agreement on one model or framework for measuring effectiveness (Daft 2001) . We briefly review several approaches to assessing effectiveness. In the rational goal (or purposive-rational) model of organizational performance as the key criterion of performance is whether an organization reaches its goals (Pfeffer 1982) . The system resource model defines effectiveness using the overall survival of the organization, "the ability to exploit its environment in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources to sustain its functioning" (Seashore and Yuchtman 1967, 393) . Participant-satisfaction models involve asking different participants about their satisfaction with the organization (Rainey 2003) ; organizational effectiveness is defined according to the ability to satisfy key strategic constituencies in its environment (Boschken 1994 All of these are generic approaches for assessing effectiveness. While they can be applied to both the public and private sectors, none offer natural measurement criteria that fit the public sector well. Table 2 offers a review of the kinds of measurement criteria of effectiveness used in empirical studies of the public. Table 2 includes studies on organizational effectiveness that develop measurement criteria and studies that predicting effectiveness using independent variables. We observe two key attributes. First, there is no common performance measure standard. As Campbell (1977) notes, a particular way to conceptualize and measure effectiveness is useful only for certain purposes; searching for a best measurement scheme as futile as searching for one best way (Behn 1996) . Collections of performance measures are usually selected with regard to trying to achieve managerial purposes (e.g., evaluation, control, budgeting, motivation, promotion, celebrations, learning, and improvement; see Behn (2003)). Second, very few studies have worked at the level of a country's entire government (for instance, the effectiveness of the entire U.S. federal government). Those that have, such as Brewer (2004), usually only cover a select few countries (such as those that have reached a certain level of economic development).
Our data on perceived effectiveness cover 212 countries. More importantly, the concepts embedded in this index include a core range of measurement schema for assessing perceptions of the effectiveness of government, namely the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
DATA DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe our data and how useful they are for assessing perceptions of government effectiveness. We also offer exploratory analysis of how perceived effectiveness varies across countries, and what factors might support perceptions of high effectiveness. We close this section by identifying countries that are exceptionally high and low performers on our index, given a simple model for explaining those perceptions.
Our data come from the World Bank Governance Matters project. Since 1996, the World Bank has built worldwide governance indicators due to a belief that governance matters -in the sense that there are strong causal relationships between good governance and development outcomes such as higher per capita income, low infant mortality, and higher literacy (Kaufmann, et al. 1999) . This indicator measures subjective perceptions regarding government effectiveness in different countries. According to Kaufmann, et al. (1999) , these data come from two types of sources: polls (surveys) of experts, which reflect country ratings produced by commercial risk rating agencies and other organizations, and cross-country surveys of residents carried out by international organizations and other non-governmental organizations. Surveys of experts capture the perceptions of country analysts at major multilateral development agencies (such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank), reflecting these individuals' in-depth experience working on the countries they assess (Kaufmann, et al. 2007 ). Surveys of residents are surveys of individuals or domestic firms (such as the World Bank's business environment surveys and the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report) with first-hand knowledge of the governance situation in the country. Kaufmann, et al. (1999) observe that subjective measuring of the quality of governance can be useful: it is often difficult to obtain objective data for many issues; perceptions may often be as important as objective differences in institutions across countries; and, other work shows that subjective perceptions have significant explanatory power for future economic outcomes (e.g., through consumer and investor expectations).
Our version of the data relies on 47 individual items taken from 18 different sources that measure different dimensions of government effectiveness. The effectiveness indicator is itself a combination of these many different individual data sources. The aggregation procedure first rescales the individual indicators from each underlying variable's source in order to make them comparable across data sources (Kaufmann, et al. 2007) . It then constructs a weighted average of each of these rescaled data sources to arrive at an aggregate indicator of government effectiveness.
The weights assigned to each data source are in turn based on the estimates of the precision of each source that are produced by the unobserved components model. Essentially, this is a "item response theory" model of survey responses. Each measure on the latent scale of "effectiveness" that underlies these up to 47 different individual items is associated with an estimate, and standard error of the estimate, and a number of sources used to construct the estimate. The number of sources used to construct an estimate for any country in a given year varies; accordingly, the estimates of the country's position on the latent variable are also noisy. Table 3 provides a detailed description of each data source and individual questions or concepts drawn from these data sources for aggregate government effectiveness indicator.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The wide variety of descriptions of the individual items, the range of countries covered, and the years for which specific sources are available shows exactly how difficult it is to measure effectiveness at this level of analysis. The range of considerations shows that in practical terms, different sources and survey houses conceptualize effectiveness differently. Some measures are only available for the most developed countries; others are widely available for an array of countries (although perhaps at the cost of offering fewer measurements per country). In descriptive terms, the average number of sources for a measurement was 6.7 with a standard deviation of 3.4
(minimum of 1 and a maximum of 14). Yet, Djibouti also records scores in the top ten of the entire dataset, a governance event that rarely receives coverage in discussions of the difficulty of running effective governments in Africa. Figure   9 shows, though, that Djibouti is clearly an unusual case in this region.
Exploring Explanations for Perceived Government Effectiveness
We now turn to series of data analyses that explore possible explanations for these differences in perceptions of government effectiveness across a variety of countries. Geographic location is a convenient way to group countries, but it does not provide a compelling explanation for the differences, and it does not delineate a mechanism that turns an attribute "input" into an effectiveness "output".
We center our investigation on eight broad categories of causes that are drawn from the literatures on comparative political economy and development. These categories are admittedly coarse and insufficient for describing the variety of ways that governments attain effectiveness and obtain positive affect on the part of outside evaluators. They are also largely structural attributes that are difficult to change in the short-run if designers are seeking ways to make governments more effective (as the World Bank clearly is). The advantage of this research strategy is that we are able to identify how much of the variance across countries in this index is due to these types of characteristics, which helps us understand how much is left for other mechanisms to contribute to in terms of explanation. We offer in Table 4 the descriptive statistics for the broad array of causes that we address here.
[Insert Table 4 Our second broad cause is the economic development of a country. Part of the World Bank's argument for addressing governance failures is that poor governance contributes to lower economic growth and adverse economic circumstances (see Brown, et al. 2007 ). This may be so, but we are similarly concerned that countries with unstable economies or lower tax bases are unable to staff and maintain quality government infrastructures, processes, and practices -and that those deficiencies become reasons for evaluators to grade some governments as having lower effectiveness. This possibility is overt in studies like La Porta, et al. (1999) . Admittedly, this can be a form of endogeneity. We address the impact of development in two parts by assessing the role of income spline. Income is divided into five categories: countries with low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and two types with high income (those that are members of the OECD and those that are not). There are two parts to this test because OECD status may produce additional benefits in terms of higher perceptions of government effectiveness. Figure 11 shows that high income, OECD countries have the highest median perceived effectiveness scores, and that scores fall as income falls. In a simple regression of the index on the spline all differences from the base case of high income, OECD countries are significant at the 0.001 level.
[Insert Figure 11 about here]
We next move to two types of structural factors that flow from the "constitutional" design of countries. First, we are interested in the impact of presidential versus parliamentary systems.
Second, we are interested in the role of federalism. Third, we address the role of a country having a proportional representation-based electoral system.
In separation-of-powers systems, the president's "decree power" or the implementability of "law made by the executive and not subject to congressional review" (Shugart and Carey 1992, 140) may reduce the perception that government is effective. This is one reason for the institutional innovation of having independent regulators (Bertelli and Whitford 2007) . Presidential systems seem to increase the costs of decision-making over parliamentary systems given the existence of redundant players . We argue that parliamentary and weak presidential systems have higher measures of government effectiveness than do strong presidential systems. Our data on the type of political system come from Beck, et al. (2001) . Figure 12 shows that true parliamentary systems do exhibit higher perceived government effectiveness than either presidential or weak (assembly-appointed) presidential systems. If anything, governments led by assembly-appointed presidents seem to have lower perceived effectiveness than to presidential systems. A simple regression of the index on the system categories (with presidential systems omitted) shows that the ordering in Figure 12 is statistically significant.
[Insert Figure 12 about here]
Federal systems may increase representation (increasing perceptions of effectiveness), but may also reduce accountability (reducing perceptions of effectiveness). Local elections may provide voice to ignored populations, but monopolization of power at the local level may also decrease the degree of accountability. There is empirical evidence, however, that federal systems are generally more corrupt than unitary systems (Treisman 2000; Gerring and Thacker 2004) . As the political pie is divided among more geographic entities, opportunities to generate political rents increase, thus we can see reductions in perceptions of effectiveness. Our data on the federalism arrangement of the country come from Beck, et al. (2001) . Figure 13 shows that federal systems may be perceived more effective than mixed or unitary systems, although the differences seem slight and each the scores for each system seem variable. A regression of the index on the federalism types (with unitary systems omitted), though, suggests that the ordering is statistically significant.
[Insert Figure 13 about here]
Single member plurality (SMP) electoral systems make it difficult to make policy decisions than do systems based on proportional representation (PR) (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2000) . The many parties that inhabit PR systems must be accommodated in policy formulation; a change in the governing coalition makes policy unstable if deals are renegotiated. PR systems are thought to be "feeble". In contrast, SMP systems organize political competition between individual members of rival parties at the level of a geographic jurisdiction. We examine whether PR systems have lower perceived effectiveness; our data on electoral systems are from Beck, et al. (2001) . At the same time, though, PR systems are more "representative" in that they do represent minority interests and deliver power to more than two parties (due to Duverger's Law Last, we test whether governments led by military officers are perceived to be less effective.
Our variable indicates whether the state's chief executive is a military officer. A "1" is recorded if
Beck, et al.'s sources (Europa, World Handbook) include a rank in the chief executive's title, "0" if they do not. Chief executives are listed as officers for the duration of their term if they had not formally retired prior to the assumption of office. If chief executives were formally retired military officers upon taking office, then this variable is scored as "0". Our source is Beck, et al. (2001) .
Interestingly, we note that in some cases military status of leaders is not related to poor governance practices. Although recent discoveries of corruption during the Pinochet years have surfaced recently, the extent to which Chilean officials participated in corrupt practices is generally thought to be low relative to other military governments in Latin America (Barros 2002) . The data indicate that military governments were perceived to be less effective (t = 17.30, Satterthwaite's d.f. = 421.14).
The magnitude of the difference is about 0.3, which is roughly one-third of a standard deviation shift in the perceived effectiveness index.
Of course, these effects are unconditional, and we understand that attributes of governments and countries are not randomly distributed. At a minimum, legal origins will not vary randomly with geography. Our next step is to estimate a simple multivariate model. Table 5 shows the results of a regression analysis using the effectiveness index as the dependent variable and including the variables listed above along with the land area of the country. This model is estimated with HuberWhite standard errors clustered on the country identifier. This last variable helps test Fesler's views about effectiveness and the spatial distribution of the state (Fesler 1942) . In total, the explanatory power of the model as a whole is more than reasonable (R 2 = 0.78). There is no evidence of collinearity, with the average variance inflation factor this model under 4.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
However, all the explanatory power in the model comes from the income spline. Perceived effectiveness is on average 2.2 points lower in low income countries than in high income, OECD countries; the standard deviation of the dependent variable is roughly one with mean zero (making it distributed standard normal), so this is equivalent to a two standard deviation shift in the dependent variable. For lower middle income countries the shift is a 1.5 point drop in perceived effectiveness, while for upper middle income countries the shift is 1.2 point drop. Each of these changes is from the score that that would be realized for a high income OECD country. There is no discernable difference for high-income non-OECD countries.
The only other significant effect is for countries with French legal origins, which experience on average a 0.3 point reduction in perceived effectiveness. None of the coefficients for the other regional or origins attributes is significantly different from zero. None of the coefficients for the other systems or federalism measures is significantly different from zero. This result is achieved while explaining 78 percent of the variance in the dependent variable, leaving only a small amount of the variance to be explained by non-income related factors. Admittedly this is result is limited by concerns of endogeneity between the dependent variable and income, yet it is unclear whether the implications of this for our understanding of what can and cannot be controlled in the search for government effectiveness. At a minimum, the effects shown in the tests not supported in a multiavariate model. Figure 14 shows the coefficient values for the regional effects, along with their associated 90 percent confidence intervals. There is some reason to believe that three regions at the bottom of the graph suffer from lower on average perceived government effectiveness, although the supports for the effects do not straddle zero only at a weak level of statistical significance. Likewise, Figure 15 suggests that countries with French and Scandinavian origins experience lower levels of perceived government effectiveness, although the effects are only weakly significantly different from zero (seen in the 90 percent confidence intervals for the effects). These are contrasted with the effects for the pieces of the income spline, where the effects are substantial and significantly different from zero for the three lowest income levels.
[Insert Figures 14, 15 , and 16 about here]
Where does this leave the study of government effectiveness if almost 80 percent of the variance in this subjective measure of effectiveness is associated the country's placement in the world income distribution? The finding that a third of standard deviation change in the index comes from having French origins is insufficient for building a science of public sector effectiveness. One consequence is that inferences about government effectiveness drawn from developed nations does not provide clear information about how those innovations would port to lesser developed nations.
The model here shows how much of an impact there is on perceived effectiveness just by moving from a country with low income to one with high income.
The relevant question is whether we can identify countries that across the board do better (or worse) than they should given the results shown from the model reported in Table 5 . Figure 17 shows the plots of the distribution of the residuals across countries ranked from more positive to more negative. Those at the top of the plot have positive residuals, meaning that they perform better in terms of perceived government effectiveness than they should given their structural characteristics. The top 5 are instructive. Ethiopia is the clear winner, reporting scores that are almost two points higher than they should be given the country's structural characteristics. The next four include one from the Middle East/North Africa, two from the Latin America/Caribbean group, and Singapore from the East Asia/Pacific group. Notable is the fact that Tunisia does not have the highest scores in its group and that while Chile and Barbados are in the upper tier of the group, they are not the highest (Chile has high performance even after account for military leadership). Singapore has long been seen as an extraordinary case (Whitford 2002) .
[Insert Figure 17 about here]
The lowest five -those that are significant underperformers -include one from Latin America, one ranking in the middle of the Eastern Europe grouping, and two ranking in the lower half of the Sub-Saharan Africa group. The notable member of this group, though, is Finland, which has the largest negative residuals with scores that are nearly two points lower than they should be based on the model in Table 5 . The results for Finland do not affect the overall model fit; the same estimates are obtained even after jackknifing the model based on large negative residuals.
We are left with two lessons for studying government effectiveness. The first is that much of determining how people perceive the effectiveness is out of the hands of institutional and policy designers; many countries simply suffer from poor economic circumstances that make it difficult to break the cycle of low government effectiveness. The second is that models like that shown in Table 5 do offer an opportunity for targeted country-level studies. Why is Ethiopia an overachiever? Why does Finland under-achieve? What does it mean that the residuals for the U.S., the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany all basically straddle zero? Is it important that our best-known cases are the ones that are virtually explained by a model in which economic development is the basic predictor of perceptions of government effectiveness?
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this paper is to explore questions: what is government effectiveness, and how can we measure it. The paper uses data from the World Bank -data that are used by decision makers around the world to form inferences about the performance of other governments -that are drawn from thousands of respondents polled by multiple survey houses about a number of key attributes of government effectiveness. We first show that the use of these data fill a significant gap in our understanding of effectiveness in a comparative perspective. Based on a number of data vignettes, we then show that a number of standard explanations for government effectiveness are unable to characterize much of what we observe in these data. Much of the variance is explained by the relative position of countries in the worldwide income distribution, with wealthier countries experience greater perceptions of effectiveness and those in the lower parts of the distribution being perceived as being less effective. Finally, we show that this approach allows us to identify countries that perform less well than they should based on this model, and those that perform better than expected. Several inferences follow. Perhaps the most compelling inference is that the comparative study of effectiveness reveals the limitations in what an already limited literature can say about governments, their effectiveness, and the role of the public sector around the globe. 
What proportion of the country's problems do you think the government can solve? Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain household services (like electricity or telephone)? Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain an identity document (like birth certificate, passport)? Government handling of health services Government handling of education 
